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Abstract 
Rapid Judgments (RJs) are assessments based on indirect 
verbal and nonverbal cues made on the basis of global 
judgments.  Advantages of RJs, compared to other time-
consuming methods of deception detection, include the 
ability to make assessments quickly, not having to use 
expensive detection equipment, and only minimal training 
for coders.  Vrij and colleagues [1] found through initial 
testing with novice observers that the viability of the RJs 
method in deception detection is promising.  The purpose 
of this research was to test the RJs method with two 
additional datasets in order to verify the reliability of the 
coding method and the accuracy of the deception 
judgments made with minimally trained coders.  Two 
hypotheses were proposed and only partially supported.   
1. Introduction 
Humans are notoriously poor at detecting deception. A 
recent meta-analysis found that people are 54% accurate, 
on average, when deciding between truth and deception 
which is only slightly above what would be found by 
chance alone [2]. Levine [3] calls the consistency of 
deception detection accuracy rates across studies one of the 
most reliable, consistent, and robust findings in all of social 
science. Even professional lie detectors such as police 
officers, unaided polygraph examiners, and judges perform 
around 56-65% and rarely exceed 70% accuracy [4, 5]. The 
reasons for poor detection are many (see [5] for a review) 
but one reason is the cognitive complexity of the detection 
task. Lie detectors must monitor a host of vocal and 
nonverbal cues as well as examine the verbal content of a 
statement for logical inconsistencies. This task is even 
more difficult when the lie detector is a party to the 
conversation rather than merely an observer because of the 
cognitive load associated with maintaining a conversation 
[6, 7] and  more difficult when the deceiver is particularly 
skilled. Thus, “unaided” deception detection, even when 
extensive training is involved, has often proven to be an 
ineffective method of deception detection [8]. 
2. Literature review 
To encourage more accurate deception detection, 
researchers have created a variety of complex data analysis 
or coding methods, either through manual human coding 
or computer-based assessment, ranging from close analysis 
of nonverbal cues [9-11], linguistic and verbal analysis of 
transcripts [12, 13], vocalic analysis of auditory cues [14-
17], and analysis of physiological information such as 
cardiovascular, respiratory, and pupillary responses [18, 
19]. These methods have been demonstrated to improve 
accuracy to over 80% but they are time-consuming and 
often require laborious hours of training, transcription of 
statements, or post-interaction analysis, often with the aid 
of specialized equipment [1, 11]. For example, the 
polygraph is designed to detect deception through 
monitoring physiological indicators of stress and arousal, 
and automated linguistic analysis can record, transcribe, 
parse, and analyze a conversation in nearly real time. Both 
of these methods, although their accuracy rates range from 
60-90%, require many hours of training and preparation 
even though they provide real-time data [19, 20].  
Training people to detect deception, even when they are 
professionals, can often be a lengthy and difficult task 
[21-23].  Accurately coding behaviors, either verbal or 
nonverbal, often requires an individual to watch a video 
clip or listen to an audio recording several times until all of 
the verbal and nonverbal behaviors have been coded [1]. In 
fact, some behaviors, such as voice pitch, often require 
special equipment for detection [24]. Researchers have 
devoted considerable attention to the training that is 
required for coders or judges of these behaviors in 
deception detection research [25]. Observers who are 
trained will often focus on those cues mentioned in the 
training program while dismissing unmentioned cues [26]. 
Therefore, training programs tend to bias the observers’ 
decisions while increasing their judgment confidence [26]. 
Levine et al. [27] found that even “bogus” training can 
increase accuracy because, as they argue, the main result 
of training is an increased vigilance but not necessarily 
greater accuracy. Masip and colleagues [26] suggest the 
idea that training should be re-examined in order not to bias 
observers’ judgments or their judgment accuracy.  This can 
be done by focusing training sessions on deception and 
truthfulness, enabling the observer to be more open minded 
and perceive every cue with more accuracy [26]. However, 
even successful training programs only increase accuracy 
by 5-10% [25, 28-30]. Thus, if accuracy can be increased 
with minimally trained coders, such a coding method 
would be a significant advancement in the study of 
deception detection. 
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An alternative to time-intensive coding or computer-
aided detection is credibility assessment based on “indirect 
cues” indicating deception [1, 31-33]. The indirect cues 
approach, also known as rapid judgments (RJ), asks coders 
to make global assessments on such aspects as the amount 
of detail provided by a speaker, rather than make a direct 
truth-deception judgment. Vrij and colleagues [1] argue 
that this method of assessment addresses several problems 
created by the unaided detection method, the manual 
human coding method, and the computer-based assessment 
methods described above. First, there is a general 
reluctance, especially on the part of unaided detectors, to 
characterize messages as deceptive. A meta-analysis of 
deception detection studies noted a distinct truth bias in 
deception judgments [34]. This tendency may be evidence 
of an availability heuristic or may stem from individuals 
wishing to extend the benefit of doubt to others who may 
actually be deceptive [35]. Credibility assessment based on 
indirect cues mitigates this issue by querying interaction 
observers about cues that are indicative of deception (e.g., 
Does this person believe what he is saying?) rather than a 
direct measure of deception (e.g., Is this person lying?). 
This avoids the undesirable task of labeling someone a 
deceiver. 
Second, there are widespread misconceptions about 
what verbal and nonverbal behaviors are correlated with 
deception. For example, there is widespread belief that eye 
gaze is indicative of deception [36] but reviews of the 
deception literature suggest that there is no connection 
between gaze aversion and deception [9, 35]. Even when 
nonverbal behaviors can be identified that are related to 
deception [9, 12, 37], these are not consistently used during 
credibility assessment by detectors [9, 35]. By assessing 
credibility via indirect cues (e.g., responding to: “Does this 
person have to think hard when answering?”), detectors of 
deception report their observations about behaviors that 
have been actually linked to deception rather than report 
observations that are stereotypically (and often incorrectly) 
associated with deception.  
A final advantage of using indirect cues is that 
assessments based on indirect cues rely on global 
judgments. These judgments can be made quickly without 
transcripts or specialized equipment and with minimal 
training. Given this, rapid judgments are preferable to both 
the subjective judgments of human lie detectors and the 
time-consuming coding methods, but only if detection 
accuracy can be consistently demonstrated. Initial studies 
testing the viability of RJs found promising results with 
novice observers [1] and police officers [33].  
Our purpose in this research is to test the RJs method 
with two additional datasets to verify the reliability of the 
coding method and the accuracy of the deception 
judgments made with minimally trained coders. 
3. Theory and Hypotheses 
The RJs approach to coding suggests that when people 
are asked to pay attention to verbal and nonverbal cues, 
rather than detect deceit, they are more accurate in their 
judgments [38]. It is further argued that people should be 
able to detect deceit immediately following their RJs 
because they have been focused on diagnostic cues rather 
than heuristic judgments [1]. After training, research has 
shown that people do become better lie detectors when they 
are instructed to look at diagnostic cues [38, 39]. Therefore, 
by focusing on cues, instead of lies, this method is more 
successful in detecting deceit  [32, 33].  
The RJs explored in this work are based on Vrij et al.’s 
[1] study. The RJ cues used in this study come from a large 
body of literature on two techniques for the analysis of 
written transcripts known as Criteria-based Content 
Analysis (CBCA) and Reality Monitoring (RM). Using 
CBCA, trained evaluators judge the presence or absence of 
nineteen criteria that are broken up into four main areas: 
(1) general characteristics, (2) specific characteristics, (3) 
motivation-related contents, and (4) offense-specific 
elements. The first area, general characteristics, consists of 
the logical structure of a statement, unstructured 
production of content, and the quantity of details provided. 
The second area, specific characteristics, includes 
contextual embedding of detail, descriptions of 
interactions, reproduction of conversation from memory, 
unexpected complications during the interview, unusual 
details that might come up, adding superfluous details, 
providing accurately reported details that are later 
misunderstood, related external associations (e.g., “I 
bragged to my friends about my receiving credit for 
someone else’s work”), accounts of subjective mental 
states, and attributions of the hypothetical perpetrator’s 
mental state. The third area, motivation-related content, 
focuses on spontaneous corrections, admitting lack of 
memory, raising doubts about one’s own testimony, self-
deprecation, and pardoning the perpetrator. Lastly, 
offense-specific elements look at details of the 
characteristics of the defense. Similarly, in RM analysis, 
evaluators use eight criteria, some of which overlap with 
CBCA, which are designed to discern between real and 
false memories including the amount of affect displayed 
and the amount of temporal and spatial information given 
(the CBCA and RM criteria are reviewed in greater detail 
by [35]). Both of these methods require transcription of 
verbal statements and laborious manual coding by 
specially trained human coders. The RJ approach draws on 
CBCA and RM but does not require transcripts or detailed 
coding. 
Vrij et al. [1] examined whether observers a) make 
rapid, reliable, and valid judgments of the frequency of 
verbal and nonverbal behaviors of interviewers and b) are 
able to detect deceit after making RJs. They had five coders 
view 52 clips of 26 liars and 26 truth tellers using 12 
3 
nonverbal cues and some of the CBCA, and RM criteria 
and then make a truth-deception judgment following their 
coding.  They trained the coders on the RJ coding scheme 
in approximately 90 minutes of training [1]. We followed 
their methodology and trained our coders on the 10 RJs 
found in Table 1, but initial analyses revealed that not all 
of the RJs were used by the interviewees in our videos, so 
only the bolded RJs were included in our analyses. 
 
Table 1: Codes and definitions 
 
Code Definition 
Quantity of Details Specific descriptions of place, 
time, persons, objects, and 
events. 
Contextual Embeddings Descriptions of time and 
location. 
Reproduction of 
Conversation 
Speech reported in its 
original form.  
Description of other’s 
Mental State 
Description of other people’s 
feelings, thoughts, or motives. 
Visual Details Description of details which 
the interviewee saw. 
Auditory Details Description of details which 
the interviewee heard.  
Spatial Information Information about locations 
and about how objects were 
related to each other.  
Temporal Details Information about time and 
duration of events 
Cognitive Operations Descriptions of inferences 
made by the participant at the 
time of the event. 
Spontaneous 
Corrections 
Corrections are made or 
information is added without 
prompting by the 
interviewer. 
 
Following the method of Vrij et al., we analyzed two 
existing datasets to further test the viability of the RJs 
approach. The first is a dataset collected by Dr. Burgoon’s 
research team at the University of Arizona which we will 
call the “Study 1 – Spontaneous Deception” [40].  In this 
study, international students from a variety of cultural 
backgrounds answered questions during an interview 
conducted by a professional polygraph examiner and were 
prompted to lie or tell the truth on the question by a 
teleprompter. The second study, which we will call the 
“Study 2 – Cheating Denial”, was conducted by Drs. 
Dunbar and Jensen’s research team at the University of 
Oklahoma in which students were induced to cheat on a 
task with a confederate and then were interviewed 
subsequent to the task by a professional polygraph 
examiner [41]. Although Vrij et al. [1] had the coders make 
a dichotomous truth-deception judgment following the 
RJs, we had our coders rate the truthfulness of the 
statement on a 7-point scale in order to be consistent with 
the interviewers’ and participants’ ratings at the time of the 
original data collection (see Vrij et al., [1], for review).  
The Vrij et al. [1] study demonstrates convincingly that 
RJs can be used reliably for short clips (interviews 2-3 
minutes in length about a “Connect Four” game) but the 
study does not speak to longer interviews like those used 
by law enforcement.  Our goal was not only to replicate the 
Vrij et al. [1] study but also to determine if any limits exist 
for the application of RJs.  
There could be several limitations that could occur with 
longer interviews. First, observers may have a harder time 
keeping track of every code that occurs in the interview 
when the segment is long and there is a lot of information 
being exchanged. Second, there is more of an opportunity 
for high and low behaviors to cancel each other out. For 
example, if one part of the interview had a great deal of 
auditory detail but another part does not, judges may be 
inclined to choose the middle of the scale.  As a result, the 
longer an interview is, the more possible it becomes for RJs 
to regress to the middle of the scale. The stimulus materials 
we used give a broader range of interview length.  
Although the Study 1 included short question-answer 
combinations similar to the Connect Four interviews used 
by Vrij et al. [1], Study 2 included interviews that were 
significantly longer, many lasting longer than 20 minutes.  
This gives more detail for the coders to use in making their 
assessments, which may make them more accurate or 
instead introduce more variability in judgments that 
reduces the reliabilities of the coders. Longer interviews 
also gives the interviewees more time to adapt to the 
questioning strategy of the interviewers, making their 
veracity more difficult to detect [12]. Vrij et al. predicted 
that RJs would be reliable and valid and we also verified 
the validity in our two studies with varying interview 
length. 
In our replication and extension of Vrij’s work with the 
RJ method, we also make the following predictions 
regarding the utility of RJs for differentiating truth and 
deception and the ability of minimally trained coders to 
make accurate truth-deception judgments after they have 
made their RJs: 
 
H1: Deceivers will demonstrate fewer of the following 
RJ criteria than truthtellers: Quantity of details, contextual 
embedding, reproduction of conversation, visual details, 
auditory details, temporal details, and spontaneous 
corrections. 
 
One advantage of using third-party coders is that they 
are able to be more objective and thus, more accurate than 
the interviewers themselves [6].  They are not as 
cognitively busy and when they use RJs, they should be 
more accurate than the interviewers who are making truth-
deception judgments. 
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H2: Coders using RJs make truthful estimates that are 
more accurate than participant-interviewers. 
4. Method 
4.1. Participants and Procedure 
Eight observers, two males and six females aged 20–
23, participated in the study. All were undergraduate 
communication majors who participated for independent 
study credit. Each observer coded between 12 and 30 
videos from each dataset and each video was coded by two 
observers. Observers coded independently on laptop 
computers with headphones using the (C# Behavioral 
Annotation System (C-BAS)) [42].  C-BAS is a computer 
program that brings up a window in which coders can see 
the video they are coding, the coding system, and their 
codes simultaneously.  They were instructed to watch the 
entire video segment and then rate the interviewee on the 7 
RJs listed above on 7-point Likert scales ranging from (1) 
absent to (5) very much present. They then rated the 
truthfulness of the participant using a 7-point scale.  
4.2. Stimulus Videos  
We selected 70 interviews from the Study 1 and 84 
interviews from Study 2 described above to comprise the 
current sample.  In the Study 1 [40], participants lied or told 
the truth on six questions in a counter-balanced order when 
questioned by professional polygraph examiners (see 
Appendix A).  All the lies were sanctioned and a 
teleprompter instructed the interviewees when to lie and 
when to tell the truth. Every three questions, the participant 
and the expert interviewer rated the participant’s 
truthfulness. Accuracy was determined by comparing the 
interviewer’s rating to the participant’s self-reported 
truthfulness on each question.  The coders for the current 
study rated the participant using RJs after each question. In 
Study 2 [41], participants played a trivia game with a 
confederate who encouraged cheating in some of the 
sessions.  Professional polygraph examiners interviewed 
participants after the game to determine cheaters and non-
cheaters. The 13 questions that were asked appear in 
Appendix B.  Lies were both sanctioned and unsanctioned 
because some participants were instructed to lie to the 
examiner by a researcher and some were not told to lie and 
so lied on their own.  Some of the interviews were 
conducted via videoconference and some were conducted 
face-to-face (FtF).  The coders for the present study rated 
the participants’ for RJs at the conclusion of the interview.   
4.3. Coding and Training   
We followed the training method used by Vrij et al. [1] 
as closely as possible.  The first author met with all eight 
coders to explain the RJ coding system and showed the 
coders examples from the video sets of all the RJs (none of 
the examples were used in the final sample).  Then, copies 
of the CBCA and RM criteria and their descriptions from 
Vrij’s 2008 book ([35]) were distributed to the coders to 
take home and read.  A week later, all eight coders met with 
the first author again and conducted some sample ratings 
using the C-BAS program.  The instructor wrote all their 
ratings on a white board and any discrepancies greater than 
1 point between the ratings were discussed, often after 
watching the segment again.  Once the first author and the 
coders felt confident about their judgments and felt that 
watching further examples was not necessary, the coders 
were allowed to conduct rating sessions on their own in the 
lab over the next six weeks.  The first author conducted 
periodic checks of the coders’ reliabilities and held 
periodic meetings with the raters one-on-one to prevent any 
slippage in reliabilities over time.  Overall, the coders spent 
approximately 90 minutes in training and approximately 15 
hours completing the judgment task. 
5. Results 
Our primary purpose in this study was to determine 
whether there were any constraints on the reliability and 
accuracy that could be achieved using RJ coding. First, we 
were concerned with whether the length of the interview 
would have an effect on inter-coder reliabilities because the 
longer interviews in Study 2 could give the coders more 
data on which to base their decisions but could also create 
conflicting data that makes a general rating more difficult. 
For Study 1, each question was rated by two different 
coders, so intraclass correlations (ICC) were computed to 
assess the inter-coder reliability for each question. The ICC 
is the correlation between one measurement on a target and 
another measurement obtained on that target and is used to 
establish a correlation between pairs of observations that 
do not have an obvious order [43].  Shrout and Fleiss 
discuss six different versions of the ICC and most can be 
calculated using the reliability analysis function in SPSS. 
We used the one-way random version of the ICC with a 
95% confidence interval and a test value of 0. The 
reliabilities, by question, for Study 1 are found in Table 2. 
The minimum acceptable ICC for inter-coder reliability is 
.60 [43]. Those RJs that achieved acceptable reliability 
between two coders are bolded in Table 2. Acceptable 
reliabilities were achieved for 60% of the ratings, but a 
quick glance at Table 2 reveals that Question 2 was 
especially problematic because acceptable reliabilities 
were not achieved on that question for any of the 7 RJ 
codes. That question, “What would you do if your boss 
gave you credit for someone else’s work?” was the only 
one that was hypothetical rather than factual in nature, 
suggesting that perhaps the type of question affects the 
reliability of the coding. Also, the auditory details criteria 
achieved acceptable reliabilities on just one question (Q3), 
suggesting that it posed the greatest problem for the coders, 
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perhaps because auditory details came up very rarely in 
these interviews (the ratings ranged from 1 to 4 on a 7-point 
scale,  M = 1.19, SD = .42). 
For the Study 2, ratings were made after watching the 
entire interview during most of which, all the participants 
were telling the truth.  Only later in the interview, when 
participants were asked about the cheating during the trivia 
game did differences emerge between the cheaters and the 
non-cheaters. Thus, coders were asked to wait until they 
had seen the entire interview before making their ratings.  
The reliabilities for the cheating study are found in Table 3 
and were also virtually all in the acceptable range. The 
exception was auditory details which proved problematic 
for coders probably because they occurred so rarely in the 
interviews (M = 1.35 SD = .72).  For comparison, we 
collapsed Study 1 into two blocks of questions because 
participants were prompted to answer truthfully or 
deceptively in blocks of three questions in a counter-
balanced order.  We dropped Q2 from Block 1 because it 
proved problematic for coders and was a different question 
type from the other questions (hypothetical rather than 
factual) and the reliabilities for Block 1 improved. Table 3 
reveals that Study 2 reliabilities were comparable to the 
Study 1 reliabilities and were mostly in the acceptable 
range.  
Hypothesis one predicted that deceivers would 
demonstrate fewer of the following RJ criteria than 
truthtellers: Quantity of details, contextual embedding, 
reproduction of conversation, visual details, auditory 
details, temporal details, and spontaneous corrections. In 
order to test this hypothesis, we conducted a MANOVA for 
the Study 1 data with question block (question 2 removed) 
and truth-deception order (TD Order) as the independent 
variables and the RJs and truthfulness ratings as the 
dependent variables. Because the participants were truthful 
or deceptive in blocks of three questions, we would expect 
a significant block X TD order interaction effect. Deceivers 
showing fewer of the RJ criteria would confirm the 
hypothesis.  
We found a significant main effect for block for 
quantity of details F (1,71)= 20.91, p <.001, η2 = .29 and 
contextual embedding F (1,71)= 5.16, p = .03, η2 =  .003, 
both of which showed greater detail and contextual 
embedding in block 2 compared to block 1 regardless of 
whether they were truth-tellers or deceivers. We also found 
a significant block X TD order interaction effect for visual 
details F (1,71)= 11.28, p = .001, η2 = .08 displayed in 
Figure 1. Contrary to the hypothesis, the results show more 
visual details being used by deceivers than truthtellers in 
block 1 and no difference in block 2. The results also 
revealed a significant block X TD order interaction effect 
for temporal details F (1,71)= 3.54, p = .05, η2 = .05. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, the means displayed in 
Figure 2 show that deceivers used fewer temporal details 
than truthtellers in the second block. For the overall ratings 
of truthfulness, the analysis revealed a significant block X 
TD order interaction effect as well F (1,71)= 3.51, p = .05, 
η2 = .05. There was no difference in truthfulness ratings 
between truthtellers and deceivers in block 1 but in block 
2, truthtellers were rated significantly more truthful than 
deceivers, indicating that coders were better able to rate 
truthfulness in block 2 than block 1 (see Figure 3).  Those 
who began with truth in block 1 became much more 
transparent when they switched to deception in block 2 
than those who began with deception and then switched to 
truth in block 2. 
For Study 2, we conducted a MANOVA with modality 
(videoconference vs. face-to-face) and truth-deception 
(TD) as the independent variables and the 7 RJs and 
truthfulness ratings as the dependent variables (we 
collapsed the sanctioned and unsanctioned deceivers into a 
single condition due to the small sample size). The results 
revealed modality main effects for reproduction of 
conversation F (1, 80) = 5.92, p = .02, η2 =.07 (FTF: M = 
2.05, SD = .87; CMC: M = 2.80, SD =1.63), auditory 
details F (1, 80) = 5.94, p = .02, η2 =.07 (FTF: M = 1.19, 
SD = .41; CMC: M = 1.48, SD =.60), and a near-significant 
main effect for temporal details F (1, 80) = 3.11, p = .08, 
η2 =.04 (FTF: M = 2.08, SD = .80; CMC: M = 2.46, SD 
=1.42). Participants conversing in CMC used more of these 
RJ criteria than those conversing via FtF. 
The results also revealed a modality X TD interaction 
effect F (1, 80) = 3.59, p = .05, η2 = .04 for visual details 
(see Figure 4). Truthtellers used more visual details than 
deceivers when conversing FtF but deceivers and 
truthtellers were virtually indistinguishable in CMC. A 
near-significant interaction effect for spontaneous 
corrections F (1, 80) = 3.22, p = .08, η2 =.04 indicated that 
truthtellers made more corrections in FtF but were similar 
to deceivers in CMC.  Both of these results are consistent 
with H1. 
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Table 2: ICC reliabilities for the 6 questions in Study 1. 
Code  Q1  
What’s the 
worst job 
you’ve ever 
had and 
why? 
Q2  
What would you 
do if your boss 
gave you credit 
for someone 
else’s work? 
Q3  
Tell me about a time 
when you thought 
about stealing 
something valuable 
Q4 
Please tell me 
everything you did 
today from when 
you woke up until 
when you arrived 
here at the lab. 
Q5  
What do you 
consider your 
greatest 
strengths? 
Q6  
What else 
will you do 
today? 
Quantity of 
Details  
.72  .55  .80  .77  .80  .78  
Contextual 
Embedding 
.04  -.32  .75  .80  .86  .77  
Reproduction of 
Conversation  
.87  .43  .74  .54  .60 .50  
Visual Details .70  -.10  .82  .65  .54  .67  
Auditory Details .56  -.14  .67  .36  -.13  .40  
Temporal Details  .30  .02  .60  .68  .72  .55  
Spontaneous 
Corrections  
.65  .46  .69  .74  .73  .74  
 
 
Table 3: ICC reliabilities for Study 1and Study 2 in 
question blocks. 
Code  Study 
2  
Study 1 
Block 1  
Study 1 
Block 1 
w/o Q2  
Study 1 
Block 2  
Quantity of 
Details 
.74  .72  .72  .80  
Contextual 
Embedding 
.75  .39  .33  .84  
Reproduction 
of 
Conversation  
.80  .82  .86  .61  
Visual 
Details 
.78  .73  .78  .63  
Auditory 
Details 
.31  .56  .70  .21  
Temporal 
Details  
.72  .40  .51  .60  
Spontaneous 
Corrections  
.77  .65  .70  .80  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Significant Block X TD Order Interaction Effect 
for Study 1 visual details 
 
Figure 2: Significant Block X TD Order Interaction Effect 
for Study 1 temporal details 
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Figure 3: Significant Block X TD Order Interaction Effect 
for Study 1 truth ratings 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Modality X TD interaction effect for Study 2 
visual details. 
 
 
Hypothesis two predicted that coders using RJs should 
make truthful estimates that are more accurate than the 
participant-interviewers. In the case of the Study 1, 
Burgoon et al. reported total accuracy of their expert 
interviewers at 60.5% with a truth accuracy of 73% and a 
lie accuracy of 48%.  Because the interviewers and 
participants rated truthfulness on a scale, we asked the RJ 
coders to also rate the truthfulness of the participants on a 
scale rather than make dichotomous truth-deception 
judgments. To determine the accuracy rates, we then 
converted those ratings into truth-deception judgments by 
designating any value below the midpoint of the 
truthfulness scale as deceptive and any value above the 
midpoint of the scale as truthful.  If an answer was rated at 
the midpoint of the scale, it was considered neither truthful 
nor deceptive and was treated as missing data in the 
analyses. This was the case in a small number of interviews 
(between 4-15 coded responses depending on the 
question). As Table 4 reveals, the accuracy of the RJ coders 
was lower than the experts who made their ratings during 
the interviews. 
For Study 2, Dunbar et al. [41] reported 58% accuracy 
overall for their expert interviewers with a truth accuracy 
of 60% and a lie accuracy (with the sanctioned and 
unsanctioned conditions combined) of 54%. The results in 
Table 4 demonstrate that the coders of the cheating study 
had an accuracy rate of 67.8% which is an improvement 
over the expert interviewers but is largely due to their 
improved truth accuracy. 
 
 
Table 4: Accuracy Rates for the CB Study 
 Study 1 Questions   
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Ave 
Study 1 
Study 2 
Number of 
Correct 
Judgments 
32 29 25 31 37 31 30.8 53 
Valid N 60 59 62 62 60 58 60.2 78 
Percent Correct 53.3% 49.1% 40% 50% 61.7% 53.4% 51.3% 67.9% 
Truth 
Accuracy 
62.2% 35.1% 43.3% 63.9% 63.9% 55.6% 54.0% 75.6% 
Lie Accuracy 25% 44.4% 25% 21.6% 37.8% 29.7% 30.6% 51.2% 
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6. Discussion 
Rapid judgments are an important innovation in the 
improvement of deception detection and have several 
advantages over the traditional use of laborious 
microscopic coding or specialized training for coders. 
However, before we can trust RJs over other 
methodologies, their viability must be demonstrated first in 
the ability of minimally trained coders to reliably judge 
them and then in the ability of RJs to accurately 
discriminate between truth and deception and lead 
observers to make accurate deceptiveness estimates. 
One advantage of RJs is that they can be used in 
deception detection with no need for written transcripts or 
specialized equipment, and minimal training time for 
coders but this is only an advantage when the coders can 
make reliable judgments. The coders in this study spent 
less than two hours in training and still achieved acceptable 
reliabilities even over long segments of interaction. The 
ICCSs presented in Table 3 comparing the two studies 
demonstrate that the reliabilities of RJs in Study 1 which 
had short question-and-answer segments were comparable 
to the longer interview-length judgments in Study 2. 
Generally, the ICCs revealed that RJs can be made reliably 
with minimal training but that the type of questions (i.e. 
hypothetical vs. factual) and the type of detail (i.e. auditory 
vs. spacial) may make a difference and should be 
investigated further. 
Hypothesis one stated that deceivers would 
demonstrate fewer of the following RJ criteria than truth 
tellers: quantity of details, contextual embedding, 
reproduction of conversation, visual details, auditory cues, 
temporal details, and spontaneous corrections. Hypothesis 
one was not supported because deceivers used more of 
some types of details (visual) but fewer of other types of 
details (temporal) and still other RJs were not significantly 
different between truth and deception. Vrij [35] cites some 
inconsistent findings for the diagnosticity of CBCA and 
RM criteria in other studies suggesting that more research 
into the nuances of when RJs are the most diagnostic is still 
needed.  Some of the variations in the directionality of RJs 
may have been a result of the differences in the questions 
asked in our two studies.  Previous studies of RJs were 
focused on questions about a particular event but our 
questions ranged from personal history questions to 
accusatory questions. The questions in block 1 of Study 1, 
for example, were very personal whereas block 2 questions 
asked about mundane daily activities. In fact, those 
individuals, regardless of whether they were deceivers or 
truth-tellers provided more details and contextual 
embedding than block 1. This is not only because block 2 
questions asked about what they did, but block 1 could 
have been incriminating to the individual, so the less detail 
the participant gave, the less detectable deceptions would 
have been. It is interesting that there were more visual 
details for deceivers than truth-tellers in block 1 (contrary 
to H1). While it is common that deceivers will shut down 
and not be overly animated, displaying fewer kinesic 
movements [9, 35], because these questions were negative, 
it is possible that deceivers were trying to overcompensate 
for their lying by appearing as if they were telling the truth 
(being more animated while speaking).  
The second hypothesis stated that coders using RJs 
should make truthful estimates that are more accurate than 
the participant-interviewers. The interviewers had overall 
accuracy rates of 60.5% and 58% in Study 1 and Study 2 
respectively. For comparison, the accuracy rates of the RJ 
coders in Study 1 ranged from 40% in Question 1 (“Tell 
me about a time when you thought about stealing 
something valuable”) to 61.7% on Question 5 (“What do 
you consider your greatest strengths?”). The lie accuracy 
in Study 1 proved especially problematic; the lie accuracy 
of the interviewers was a less-than-impressive 48% but the 
lie accuracy of the RJ coders was only 30.6%. The RJ 
coders fared better in Study 2 with the longer interviews, 
achieving an overall accuracy rate of 67.9% (10% higher 
than the interviewers). Therefore, the longer interviews 
seemed to have increased accuracy rather than hindered it. 
Longer interviews may have enabled both the participant-
interviewer and the coder to have more information and 
more RJs on which to base their global assessment. In 
Study 2, the coders not only attained improved detection 
accuracy over Study 1 but also better than the participant-
interviewers in Study 2. This can be attributed to the ability 
of coders to replay the clip as many times as possible, 
whereas participant-interviewers cannot rewind a live 
interaction. This could have increased the accuracy 
between coders and participant-interviewers in Study 2 
although it is not known how many of the coders really 
used the rewinding and replaying features that were 
available to them. Future research should investigate 
whether observers watching live interactions (and thus 
making judgments under the same conditions as the 
participant-interviewers) are more accurate than the 
participant-interviewers themselves. 
7. Conclusion 
The premise of the RJs approach to coding is that when 
people are asked to pay attention to verbal and nonverbal 
cues rather than attempt to detect deceit, they are more 
accurate in their judgments [38, 39].  Initial testing of RJs 
as a method of deception detection proved promising. In 
this study, two datasets were used to validate the reliability 
and accuracy of RJs as a viable method of detection 
deception.  We found that minimally trained coders were 
indeed able to reliably make RJs after watching both long 
and short segments of interactions.  The coders who viewed 
longer segments were more accurate than both the coders 
who viewed shorter segments and the participant-
interviewers. The RJs did not discriminate between truth 
and deception in the manner that was hypothesized which 
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raises more questions about the conditions under which 
making RJs from verbal and nonverbal cues achieves 
accurate detection of veracity. Future research could 
profitably isolate what conditions are most amenable to the 
RJ approach and what cues are likely to be the most 
diagnostic for judges with limited training. 
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